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Sovereign Wealth Funds: Investors
in search of an identity in the
twenty-first century
Locknie Hsu*
ABSTRACT
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs), as they have come to be known, are a hybrid type of foreign
investor. They invest beyond their own borders with an aim to maximize returns as a foreign
investor is expected to. At the same time, they are closely associated with governments, by
ownership, source of funding, and/or investment objectives. Even as within this group, individual
SWFs take various forms and may have divergent investment priorities and risk approaches. There
is not even a universal definition of SWFs. As a result, they are often not viewed as typical foreign
investors. The association of a SWF with a foreign government has raised various issues such as
national security, trade protectionism and nationalism in the recipient countries. At the same time,
due to the government ownership of some SWFs, they may fall into the group of business entities
known as state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Given that SOEs are highly influential in some states,
some recipient states have sought to subject SOEs to greater disciplines, such as in ensuring
competition law and transparency principles apply to them, in order to level the playing field for
other enterprises. Such disciplines have begun to appear in trade and investment treaties, and are
coupled with the usual broad definitions of “investor” in such treaties. It is perhaps too early to
state that there is a trend of greater legal and cross-border scrutiny over SOEs, and along with
them, SWFs, in treaties. The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement that is under negotiation is an
example of a potentially game-changing treaty which could affect SWFs qua SOEs. The challenge
for SWFs is to carve a distinct identity in the twenty-first century, as more treaties that impose
binding requirements arise. This article examines some recent developments, how SWFs may need
to forge a unique identity and challenges of recipient states in balancing investment openness and
the above concerns.
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ﺻﻨﺎﺩﻳﻖﺍﻟﺜﺮﻭﺓﺍﻟﺴﻴﺎﺩﻳﺔ:
ﺍﻟﻤﺴﺘﺜﻤﺮﻭﻥﺍﻟﺒﺎﺣﺜﻮﻥﻋﻦﻫﻮﻳﺔﻟﻬﻢ
ﻓﻲﺍﻟﻘﺮﻥﺍﻟﺤﺎﺩﻱﻭﺍﻟﻌﺸﺮﻳﻦ
ﻣﻠﺨﺺ
ﺻﻨﺎﺩﻳﻖﺍﻟﺜﺮﻭﺓﺍﻟﺴﻴﺎﺩﻳﺔ،ﻛﻤﺎﺃﺻﺒﺢُﻳﻄﻠﻖﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ،ﻫﻲﻧﻮﻉﻫﺠﻴﻦﻣﻦﺍﻟﻤﺴﺘﺜﻤﺮﻳﻦﺍﻷﺟﺎﻧﺐ؛ﻓﻬﻲﺗﺴﺘﺜﻤﺮ
ﺧﺎﺭﺝﺣﺪﻭﺩﻫﺎﺑﻬﺪﻑﺗﺤﻘﻴﻖﺃﻗﺼﻰﻗﺪﺭﻣﻦﺍﻟﻌﺎﺋﺪﺍﺕ،ﻛﻤﺎﻫﻮﻣﺘﻮﻗﻊﻣﻦﺍﻟﻤﺴﺘﺜﻤﺮﺍﻷﺟﻨﺒﻲ.ﻭﻓﻲﺍﻟﻮﻗﺖ
ﻧﻔﺴﻪ،ﻓﻬﻲﺗﺮﺗﺒﻂﺍﺭﺗﺒﺎًﻃﺎﻭﺛﻴًﻘﺎﺑﺎﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﺎﺕ،ﺳﻮﺍﺀﻓﻴﻤﺎﻳﺘﻌﻠﻖﺑﺎﻟﻤﻠﻜﻴﺔ،ﻭ/ﺃﻭﻣﺼﺪﺭﺍﻟﺘﻤﻮﻳﻞ،ﻭ/ﺃﻭﺃﻫﺪﺍﻑ
ﺍﻻﺳﺘﺜﻤﺎﺭ.ﻭﺣﺘﻰﻓﻲﺇﻃﺎﺭﻫﺬﻩﺍﻟﻤﺠﻤﻮﻋﺔ،ﺗﺘﺨﺬﺻﻨﺎﺩﻳﻖﺍﻟﺜﺮﻭﺓﺍﻟﺴﻴﺎﺩﻳﺔﺍﻟﻔﺮﺩﻳﺔﺃﺷﻜﺎًﻻﻣﺨﺘﻠﻔﺔ،ﻭﻗﺪﺗﻜﻮﻥ
ﻟﻬﺎﺃﻭﻟﻮﻳﺎﺕﺍﺳﺘﺜﻤﺎﺭﻭﻣﻨﻬﺠﻴﺎﺕﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮﻣﺘﺒﺎﻳﻨﺔ.ﻭﻻﻳﻮﺟﺪﺗﻌﺮﻳﻒﻋﺎﻟﻤﻲﻟﺼﻨﺎﺩﻳﻖﺍﻟﺜﺮﻭﺓﺍﻟﺴﻴﺎﺩﻳﺔ.ﻭﻧﺘﻴﺠﺔ
ﻟﺬﻟﻚ،ﻻُﻳﻨﻈﺮﺇﻟﻴﻬﻢﻓﻲﺍﻟﻐﺎﻟﺐﻋﻠﻰﺃﻧﻬﻢﻣﺴﺘﺜﻤﺮﻭﻥﺃﺟﺎﻧﺐﻣﻦﺍﻟﻨﻮﻉﺍﻟﻨﻤﻄﻲ.ﻭﻗﺪﺃﺛﺎﺭﺍﺭﺗﺒﺎﻁﺻﻨﺎﺩﻳﻖ
ﺍﻟﺜﺮﻭﺓﺍﻟﺴﻴﺎﺩﻳﺔﺑﺤﻜﻮﻣﺔﺃﺟﻨﺒﻴﺔﻗﻀﺎﻳﺎﻣﺨﺘﻠﻔﺔ،ﻣﺜﻞﺍﻷﻣﻦﺍﻟﻘﻮﻣﻲﻭﺍﻟﺤﻤﺎﺋﻴﺔﺍﻟﺘﺠﺎﺭﻳﺔﻭﺍﻟﻘﻮﻣﻴﺔﻓﻲﺍﻟﺒﻠﺪﺍﻥ
ﺍﻟﻤﺴﺘﻠﻤﺔﻟﻬﺎ.ﻭﻓﻲﺍﻟﻮﻗﺖﻧﻔﺴﻪ،ﻭﻧﻈًﺮﺍﻟﻤﻠﻜﻴﺔﺍﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﺔﻟﺒﻌﺾﺻﻨﺎﺩﻳﻖﺍﻟﺜﺮﻭﺓﺍﻟﺴﻴﺎﺩﻳﺔ،ﻓﺈﻧﻬﺎﻗﺪﺗﻘﻊ
ﺿﻤﻦﻣﺠﻤﻮﻋﺔﺍﻟﻜﻴﺎﻧﺎﺕﺍﻟﺘﺠﺎﺭﻳﺔﺍﻟﻤﻌﺮﻭﻓﺔﺑﺎﺳﻢﺍﻟﺸﺮﻛﺎﺕﺍﻟﻤﻤﻠﻮﻛﺔﻟﻠﺪﻭﻝ.ﻭﻧﻈًﺮﺍﻷﻥﺍﻟﺸﺮﻛﺎﺕﺍﻟﻤﻤﻠﻮﻛﺔ
ﻟﻠﺪﻭﻝﻟﻬﺎﺗﺄﺛﻴﺮﻛﺒﻴﺮﻓﻲﺑﻌﺾﺍﻟﺪﻭﻝ،ﻓﻘﺪﺳﻌﺖﺑﻌﺾﺍﻟﺪﻭﻝﺍﻟﻤﺘﻠﻘﻴﺔﺇﻟﻰﺇﺧﻀﺎﻉﺍﻟﺸﺮﻛﺎﺕﺍﻟﻤﻤﻠﻮﻛﺔ
ﻟﻠﺪﻭﻝﻟﻤﺰﻳﺪﻣﻦﺍﻟﻘﻮﺍﻋﺪ،ﻣﺜﻞﺿﻤﺎﻥﺗﻄﺒﻴﻖﻗﻮﺍﻧﻴﻦﺍﻟﻤﻨﺎﻓﺴﺔﻭﻣﺒﺎﺩﺉﺍﻟﺸﻔﺎﻓﻴﺔﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ،ﻣﻦﺃﺟﻞﺗﺤﻘﻴﻖ
ﺗﻜﺎﻓﺆﺍﻟﻔﺮﺹﺑﺎﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔﻟﻠﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎﺕﺍﻷﺧﺮﻯ.ﻭﻗﺪﺑﺪﺃﺕﻫﺬﻩﺍﻟﻘﻮﺍﻋﺪﻓﻲﺍﻟﻈﻬﻮﺭﻓﻲﻣﻌﺎﻫﺪﺍﺕﺍﻟﺘﺠﺎﺭﺓ
ﻭﺍﻻﺳﺘﺜﻤﺎﺭ،ﻭﺗﻘﺘﺮﻥﺑﺎﻟﺘﻌﺎﺭﻳﻒﺍﻟﻮﺍﺳﻌﺔﺍﻟﻤﻌﺘﺎﺩﺓ»ﻟﻠﻤﺴﺘﺜﻤﺮ«ﻓﻲﻫﺬﻩﺍﻟﻤﻌﺎﻫﺪﺍﺕ.ﻭﻗﺪﻳﻜﻮﻥﻣﻦﺍﻟﺴﺎﺑﻖ
ﻷﻭﺍﻧﻪﺍﻟﻘﻮﻝﺇﻥﻫﻨﺎﻙﺍﺗﺠﺎًﻫﺎﺇﻟﻰﻣﺰﻳﺪﻣﻦﺍﻟﺘﺪﻗﻴﻖﺍﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮﻧﻲﺍﻟﻌﺎﺑﺮﻟﻠﺤﺪﻭﺩﻋﻠﻰﺍﻟﺸﺮﻛﺎﺕﺍﻟﻤﻤﻠﻮﻛﺔﻟﻠﺪﻭﻝ،
ﻭﻣﻌﻬﺎﻛﺬﻟﻚﺻﻨﺎﺩﻳﻖﺍﻟﺜﺮﻭﺓﺍﻟﺴﻴﺎﺩﻳﺔﻓﻲﺍﻟﻤﻌﺎﻫﺪﺍﺕ.ﺇﻥﺍﺗﻔﺎﻕﺍﻟﺸﺮﺍﻛﺔﻋﺒﺮﺍﻟﻤﺤﻴﻂﺍﻟﻬﺎﺩﺉﺍﻟﺨﺎﺿﻊ
ﻟﻠﺘﻔﺎﻭﺽﻫﻮﻣﺜﺎﻝﻋﻠﻰﻣﻌﺎﻫﺪﺓﻣﺤﺘﻤﻠﺔﺗﻐﻴﺮﻣﻦﻣﺴﺎﺭﺍﻷﻣﻮﺭ،ﻭﺍﻟﺘﻲﻳﻤﻜﻦﺃﻥﺗﺆﺛﺮﻋﻠﻰﺻﻨﺎﺩﻳﻖﺍﻟﺜﺮﻭﺓ
ﺍﻟﺴﻴﺎﺩﻳﺔﺑﺼﻔﺘﻬﺎﺷﺮﻛﺎﺕﻣﻤﻠﻮﻛﺔﻟﻠﺪﻭﻝ.ﻭﻳﺘﻤﺜﻞﺍﻟﺘﺤﺪﻱﺍﻟﺬﻱﺗﻮﺍﺟﻬﻪﺻﻨﺎﺩﻳﻖﺍﻟﺜﺮﻭﺓﺍﻟﺴﻴﺎﺩﻳﺔﻓﻲﺗﺤﺪﻳﺪ
ﻫﻮﻳﺔﻣﻤﻴﺰﺓﻟﻬﺎﻓﻲﺍﻟﻘﺮﻥﺍﻟﺤﺎﺩﻱﻭﺍﻟﻌﺸﺮﻳﻦ،ﺣﻴﺚﻳﻨﺸﺄﺍﻟﻤﺰﻳﺪﻣﻦﺍﻟﻤﻌﺎﻫﺪﺍﺕﺍﻟﺘﻲﺗﻔﺮﺽﺷﺮﻭًﻃﺎﻣﻠﺰﻣﺔ.
ﻭﺗﺒﺤﺚﻫﺬﻩﺍﻟﻤﻘﺎﻟﺔﺑﻌﺾﺍﻟﺘﻄﻮﺭﺍﺕﺍﻷﺧﻴﺮﺓ،ﻭﻛﻴﻒﻳﻤﻜﻦﻟﺼﻨﺎﺩﻳﻖﺍﻟﺜﺮﻭﺓﺍﻟﺴﻴﺎﺩﻳﺔﺃﻥﺗﺮﺳﻢﻫﻮﻳﺔﻓﺮﻳﺪﺓﻟﻬﺎ
ﻭﺗﺤﺪﻳﺎﺕﻟﻠﺪﻭﻝﺍﻟﻤﺴﺘﻠﻤﺔﻓﻲﺗﺤﻘﻴﻖﺍﻟﺘﻮﺍﺯﻥﺑﻴﻦﺍﻻﻧﻔﺘﺎﺡﺍﻻﺳﺘﺜﻤﺎﺭﻱﻭﺍﻟﻤﺨﺎﻭﻑﺍﻟﻤﺬﻛﻮﺭﺓﺃﻋﻼﻩ.
I. INTRODUCTION
The history of Soverign Wealth Funds (SWFs) is generally described as having begun with the first
SWF being formed by Kuwait in the 1950s.1 The term “SWF” did not exist then and did not, in fact,
exist till recently.2 While there has not been a universal definition of SWFs, there have been
various efforts to define them as a group. The European Union, for example, explains SWFs as
follows:
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) are generally defined as state-owned investment vehicles,
which manage a diversified portfolio of domestic and international financial assets.
Their origin dates back to the 1950s, when some major commodity exporting countries,
particularly oil-rich countries, were looking for a way to invest funds originated by foreign
exchange assets.3
In the United States, some common definitions refer to the risk tolerance and source of the
funds.4 The International Monetary Fund defines SWFs by their objectives and activities, which fall
1See Martin A. Weiss, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS: BACKGROUND AND POLICY ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 4 (2008), available at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/110750.pdf.
2Id.
3A Common European Approach to Sovereign Wealth Funds, Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, at 8, COM
(2008) 115 provisional, available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/sovereign_en.pdf.
4The US Treasury Department has used the following definition: “a government investment vehicle which is funded
by foreign exchange assets, and which manages those assets separately from the official reserves of the monetary
authorities (the Central Bank and reserve-related functions of the Finance Ministry).” See Weiss, supra note 1, at 4;
Robert M. Kimmitt, In Praise of Foreign Investment, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 62 (Spring 2008), http://www.international-
economy.com/TIE_Sp08_Kimmitt.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2014). See also Larry Catá Backer, Sovereign Wealth Funds
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into five categories.5 The non-binding Santiago Principles, established in 2008 by an International
Working Group through facilitation of the International Monetary Fund, uses the following
definition:
[S]pecial purpose investment funds or arrangements, owned by the general government.
Created by the general government for macroeconomic purposes, SWFs hold, manage, or
administer assets to achieve financial objectives, and employ a set of investment strategies
which include investing in foreign financial assets. The SWFs are commonly established out
of balance of payments surpluses, official foreign currency operations, the proceeds of
privatizations, fiscal surpluses, and/or receipts resulting from commodity exports.6
Notably, this definition expressly excludes (to the extent it can do so clearly) “state-owned
enterprises in the traditional sense.”7
Departing from the above formulations, one author has chosen to define SWFs as “funds
established, owned and operated by local or central governments, which investment strategies
include the acquisition of equity interest in companies listed in international markets operating in
sectors considered strategic by their countries of incorporation.”8 This latter definition seeks to
include aspects not adequately captured in others, including the manner of state involvement and
the sectors that are of interest to the funds. Other typologies exist as well.9
While the above definitions are certainly useful building blocks toward understanding SWFs
and their global activities, it is submitted that ultimately, one must look at how national laws
and treaty instruments define and treat SWFs as these create pragmatic legal outcomes which
both affect SWF conduct, governance by their home states, and treatment by their host states.
One example of a divergence in how SWFs are treated (rather than merely defined) is in the
area of taxation, where national laws are not uniform in their approach. This relates to the
issue of whether such a state recognizes state immunity (in this context, from taxes) in the
case of a SWF. This perpetuates the ambiguity arising from the public-yet-private nature of such
funds.10
II. PRIVATE, PUBLIC, QUASI-PRIVATE OR NONE OF THE ABOVE?
Even with this collective moniker and such explanations, SWFs have been suffering an identity
crisis of sorts. There are three main reasons contributing to this ambiguity of character. First, the
government ownership and investment roles together produce a hybrid type of entity that is
neither a pure state organ nor a pure private enterprise. Such entities wield tremendous – and to
Footnote continued
as Regulatory Chameleons: The Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Funds and Public Global Governance through Private
Global Investment, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 425, 437–38 (2010).
5
SWFs are a heterogeneous group and may serve various purposes. Five types of SWFs can be
distinguished based on their main objective: (i) stabilization funds, where the primary objective is to
insulate the budget and the economy against commodity (usually oil) price swings; (ii) savings funds
for future generations, which aim to convert nonrenewable assets into a more diversified portfolio of
assets and mitigate the effects of Dutch disease; (iii) reserve investment corporations, whose assets
are often still counted as reserve assets, and are established to increase the return on reserves;
(iv) development funds, which typically help fund socio-economic projects or promote industrial
policies that might raise a country’s potential output growth; and (v) contingent pension reserve funds,
which provide (from sources other than individual pension contributions) for contingent unspecified
pension liabilities on the government’s balance sheet.
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS – A WORK AGENDA, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 5 (2009), available at http://www.imf.org/external/
np/pp/eng/2008/022908.pdf.
6INT’L WORKING GRP. OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES (GAPP) 3 (2008) [hereinafter
SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES], available at http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/eng/santiagoprinciples.pdf.
7See id. This exclusion was highlighted by David Murray in a keynote speech: SWFs: Myths and Realities 16
(May 5, 2011) (transcript available at http://www.ifswf.org/pst/london11.pdf).
8Fabio Bassan, The Differences between SOEs and SWFs, in THE LAW OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 32 (Edward Elgar ed.,
2011).
9See id. at 20 (citing C. Chao, The Rise of Global Sovereign Wealth Funds, 10 MODERN BANKERS (2006);
Adam D. Dixon & Ashby H. B. Monk, Rethinking the Sovereign in Sovereign Wealth Funds, 37 TRANSACTIONS INST. BRIT.
GEOGRAPHERS 104, 108–14 (2012).
10For other aspects on divergence in state immunity treatment vis-à-vis SWFs, see Gaukrodger, D. (2010), “Foreign
State Immunity and Foreign Government Controlled Investors”, OECD Working Papers on International Investment,
2010/02, OECD Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5km91p0ksqs7-en; Bassan, supra note 8, at 89–115.
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some, alarming - economic power, as the 2008–2009 financial crisis and their “rescues” of
private entities have shown.11 Secondly, while the funds for investment by SWF entities are
state-owned, SWFs are not necessarily similar to state-owned enterprises, which, though owned
in full or in part by a state, may or may not have investment functions. Rather, state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) generally have main functions other than investment, such as trading in or
supplying of goods and/or services.
Indeed, even SWFs themselves are not all alike; they may differ for example in structure, level
of government ownership and risk approaches.12 Thirdly, SWFs have been viewed both with
enthusiasm (for the funds they can contribute to badly-needed sectors of an economy) and
suspicion (over concerns ranging from threats to national security, threats to competition and
fears of leakage of sensitive data or information). As a result they have often raised questions
as to whether they are a friend or a foe. SWFs’ activities have been described as “state
capitalism,”13 in that they participate in traditionally private capitalist endeavors, such as
investment for returns. Others have suggested the possibility of SWFs as development tools.14
The heterogeneity within the group further complicates attitudes towards them.15 SWFs have also
been discussed in the context of overlaps with state-owned enterprises and state-influenced
enterprises (SIEs).16
Whether SWFs take the form of a central bank that invests abroad, or a corporate entity formed
to invest state funds, the source of funding ultimately springs from government. In this regard it is
hard for them to escape linkage – even if indirect – with a government. On the other hand, SWFs
are often corporate entities which embrace private-investor approaches to risk and returns. In this
regard they operate not purely as a government “arm” or regulatory organ, as they may exist
primarily to make investment returns.
11See, e.g., the hearings before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee during this period. Sovereign Wealth
Funds: Foreign Policy Consequences in an Era of New Money, 110th Cong. (2008) available at http://www.gpo.gov/fds
ys/pkg/CHRG-110shrg48061/html/CHRG-110shrg48061.htm. Norway’s SWFs value (currently estimated to exceed US
$800billion) are expected to reach US$1trillion by 2020, while the United Arab Emirates’ Abu Dhabi funds are
reported to stand at over US$700billion. Matthew Price, Norway: Is world’s largest sovereign wealth fund too big?,
BBC NEWS (Sept. 12, 2013, 20:08), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-24049876. For an overview of SWF fund
sizes, see the data at the website of the Sovereign Wealth Institute, at http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings/.
Several SWFs have arisen in Asia and the Middle East in recent decades.
12As Peter Mandelsohn, the then EU Trade Commissioner, summed it up: “[I]t is important not to talk about the
sovereign funds as if they were an amorphous block. They do not have a single brain or governing mind.” OECD
Conference: Putting Sovereign Wealth in Perspective (Mar. 28, 2008) (transcript available at http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_SPEECH-08-155_en.htm). On SOEs in Asia, see generally Corporate governance of state-owned
enterprises in Asia, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceofstate-ownedenterprisesinasia.htm
(last visited Feb. 17, 2014).
13See, e.g., Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen, Investment Treaties and the Globalisation of State Capitalism:
Opportunities and Constraints for Host States, in PROSPECTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY – WORLD TRADE FORUM
73 (2013); Gerard Lyons, State Capitalism: the Rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 14 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 179 (2008).
14See, e.g., Rumu Sarkar, Sovereign Wealth Funds as a Development Tool for ASEAN Nations: From Social Wealth to
Social Responsibility, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 621 (2010).
15For other colorful characterizations of SWFs, see, e.g., Locknie Hsu, New York State Bar Association International
Conference: Trojan Horses or White Knights (Oct. 2009); Mihir A. Desai and Dhammika Dharmapala, Taxing the Bandit
Kings, 118 YALE L.J. 98 (2008); Edwin M. Truman, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Threat or Salvation?, Sept. 2010, PETERSON
INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, http://www.iie.com/publications/briefs/truman4983.pdf; Backer, supra note 4.
Others have described SWF investment activity as “a reversal of neo-colonialism.” Yvonne Lee, A Reversal of
Neo-Colonialism: The Pitfalls and Prospects of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 40 GEO. J. INT’L L. (2009) 1103; see also Patrick
Schuette, Tamed Tigers: Sovereign Wealth Funds as Passive Investors, ILL. BUS. L.J. (Nov. 3, 2008), http://www.law.illi
nois.edu/bljournal/post/2008/11/03/Tamed-Tigers-Sovereign-Wealth-Funds-as-Passive-Investors.aspx. The status of a
SWF entity vis-à-vis new “rules” may not always be immediately clear. See, e.g., Temasek says it is not a sovereign
wealth fund, THE STRAITS TIMES, Mar. 22, 2008, at 77; and see Bryan Lee, Guidelines for wealth funds apply to Temasek,
says Ministry, THE STRAITS TIMES, Apr. 1, 2008, http://news.asiaone.com/print/News/The%2BStraits%2BTimes/Story/
A1Story20080401-57250.html; see also Sovereign Wealth Funds in East Asia, WORLD BANK n.12 (June 20, 2008), https://
openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/12639/705770ESW0P1110NAL00310July020080v2.txt?
sequence¼2 (last visited Jan. 15, 2014); see also Chia Yan Min, Temasek’s a ‘one-of-a-kind sovereign wealth
fund,’ASIAONE, Dec. 8, 2013, http://business.asiaone.com/news/temaseks-one-kind-sovereign-wealth-fund (more recent
statements by Temasek Chairman, Mr. Lim Boon Heng). For a discussion of the possible reasons as to the ambiguity
surrounding SWFs, seeSaadia M. Pekkanen & Kellee S. Tsai, The Politics of Ambiguity in Asia’s SWFs, 13 BUS. & POL. 1
(2011).
16With respect to SIEs, see, e.g., Daniel M. Shapiro & Steven Globerman, The International Activities and Impacts of
State-owned Enterprises, in SOVEREIGN INVESTING 105 (Sauvant, Sachs, Yongbloed eds., 2012).
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The various views, which are still in the process of formation,17 reflect a degree of suspicion and
distrust toward SWFs. Indeed, when speaking in support of a multilateral code of conduct for SWFs
in 2008, Peter Mandelsohn, the then EU Trade Commissioner, warned against paranoia,
“demonizing” them and “stoking fears,” and that “the challenge for Europe and the United States
is to respond to thegrowth of these funds in a reasoned and reasonable way.”18 At the same time,
the ambivalence over whether to treat SWFs as private, public, quasi-public or unique entities,
continues to occupy law-makers.19
III. PROTECTIONISM AND SECURITY CONCERNS
Chief among the concerns surrounding SWFs and their economic clout is whether they are being
used in a manner that threatens trade competition and national security in the recipient state.
Such concerns over SWFs have been highly apparent.20 While there have been a number of
expressions of deep concern as to their motives and effects on the recipient economy, there have
also been spirited defences that seek to debunk certain “myths” about SWFs.21
One explanation of a perceived disconnect between the US investment review authorities and
SWFs as foreign investors, which may foster suspicion and such concerns, is as follows:
SWFs and the United States speak different languages when it comes to state-backed
investments, a miscommunication that adds to the difficulties of any review. Foreign
entities need to understand that the U.S. economy has no tradition of government
ownership and that such ownership has long been suspect. At the same time, Americans
must remember that government ownership in the economy is often prevalent elsewhere
and that in some places there are still relatively few alternatives to such ownership.
Often overlooked is the fact that the performance of SWFs in the United States is watched
closely back at home. This internal pressure comes from the rising profile of SWFs and the
increasing importance that many states attach to them. Although governments have not
been particularly successful private market participants in the past—due to misaligned
incentive structures and less sensitivity to market stimuli—internal pressures for economic
success can work to change this trend. These pressures are critical components of SWF
investment behavior and key protectors against nefarious conduct.22
As a result of such concerns, a number of national laws have been strengthened in recent years to
allow states greater power to scrutinize investments made by foreign-state-owned enterprises,
particularly on grounds of national security. While academic views have varied, there has been a
suggestion to subject SWFs to targeted limitations.23
IV. NATIONAL LAWS
In response to national security concerns and rising SWF activity, some developed countries have
enacted or amended legislation to reflect these developments. As such, laws have been examined
in detail elsewhere, these (and some updates) are raised just briefly here to provide the broader
background of legal developments that SWFs continue to face.24 In 2008, for instance, the US
17See Clare O’ Brien, Tania Matte & Naveen Thomas, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Evolving Perceptions and Strategies,
BLOOMBERG BNA, Dec. 24, 2012, http://www.shearman.com/,/media/Files/NewsInsights/Publications/2013/01/
Sovereign%20Wealth%20Funds%20Evolving%20Perceptions%20and%20__/Files/View%20full%20article%20Sovereign
%20Wealth%20Funds%20Evolvin__/FileAttachment/SovereignWealthFundsEvolvingPerceptionsandStrate__.pdf.
18Mandelsohn, supra note 12.
19See Bassan, supra note 8, at 17.
20By now, the Dubai Ports World story has become well known. See, e.g., David E. Sanger, Under Pressure, Dubai
Group Drops Port Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/10/politics/10ports.html?
pagewanted¼all&_r ¼ 0; and JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33388, THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES (CFIUS) 1, 6 (2014), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33388.pdf.
21See, e.g., Murray, supra note 7.
22Michael E. Plotkin, Foreign Direct Investment by Sovereign Wealth Funds: Using the Market and the Committee
on Foreign Investment in the United States Together To Make the United States More Secure, 118 YALE L.J. 88, 91
(2008).
23See, e.g., Edwin M. Truman, Do the Rules Need to be Changed for State-controlled Entities? The Case of
Sovereign Wealth Funds, in SOVEREIGN INVESTING 409 (Sauvant, Sachs, Yongbloed eds., 2012).
24For a discussion of such laws, see works by this author: Multi-Sourced Norms Affecting Sovereign Wealth Funds:
A Comparative View of National Laws, Cross-Border Treaties and ‘Codes’, 10 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 793 (2009);
A Decade of Security-related Developments in Trade and Investment, 11 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 697 (2010); and
Sovereign Wealth Funds, Recent US Legislative Changes, and Treaty Obligations, 43 J. WORLD TRADE 451 (2009).
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enacted the Foreign Investments and National Security Act 2007 (FINSA) and its implementing
regulations in 2008.25 The implementing authority is the Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States (CFIUS).26
Canada administers an investment screening system under the Investment Canada Act, whose
key criterion for admission is whether the investment is “of net benefit” to the Canadian economy.
National security was not an explicit factor in evaluating investments until the law was amended
in 2009. Recent amendments – discussed further below – have added a term (“state-owned
enterprise”) to buttress the evaluation process for SWF investments.
Australia administers an investment screening process under her Foreign Acquisitions and
Takeovers Act (FATA).27 Under current foreign investment policy, all foreign governments and their
related entities3 should notify the government and get prior approval before making a direct
investment in Australia, regardless of the value of the investment, and they also need to notify the
government and get prior approval to start a new business or to acquire an interest in land,
including any interest in a prospecting, exploration, mining or production tenement (except when
buying land for diplomatic or consular requirements).28
In 2008, the European Union outlined a policy for a common approach to SWFs, and national
rules fall for scrutiny under general EU law. Member states remain able to regulate at the national
Footnote continued
See also chapters 7, 10, 12, 14, 15 and 16 dealing with issues in national security and SWFs in SOVEREIGN INVESTING,
supra note 16. See also Senate Committee hearing statements, such as Sovereign Wealth Fund Acquisitions and
Other Foreign Government Investments in the U.S.: Assessing the Economic and National Security Implications, SENATE.
GOV (Nov. 14, 2007, 2:00 PM), http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction¼Hearings.Hearing&Heari
ng_ID ¼ 4c63b142-fd5c-4b82-aff9-75e254271056; and US Senate Committee Hearing on Sovereign Wealth Funds, SWF
INSTITUTE, Apr. 28, 2008, http://www.swfinstitute.org/other-swf-news/us-senate-committee-hearing-on-sovereign-wealth-
funds/. See alsoBassan, supra note 8, at 55–67.
25Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 (FINSA 2007), H.R. 556, Pub. L. No. 110-49 (2007), available
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-110publ49/html/PLAW-110publ49.htm; see also generally the information at
CFIUS Reform: The Foreign Investment & National Security Act of 2007 (FINSA), TREASURY.GOV, http://www.treasury.gov/
resource-center/international/foreign-investment/Documents/Summary-FINSA.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2014).
Investment screening legislation in the US was not new - in 1975, President Gerald Ford had by Executive Order
already introduced an inter-agency body, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to
oversee foreign investments. This Committee had no enforcement powers. In the late 1980s, the US enacted
legislation to strengthen the investment screening regime, in the form of the Exon-Florio Amendment to the Defense
Production Act of 1950; this Amendment formed part of the Omnibus Foreign Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,
Public Law 100-148. The Amendment essentially established a statutory basis for the CFIUS and a review procedure
to screen foreign mergers, acquisitions and takeovers of US companies; the President could block such transactions
if they threatened US “national security.” In July 2007, President George W. Bush signed into law amendments to the
Exon-Florio Amendment, in the form of the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 (FINSA 2007).
Its preamble states that it aims: “[t]o ensure national security while promoting foreign investment and the creation
and maintenance of jobs, to reform the process by which such investments are examined for any effect they may
have on national security, to establish the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, and for other
purposes.” For a recent overview of CFIUS and its activities, see THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
(CFIUS), supra note 20.
26For SWFs investing in banking entities, the US Federal Reserve also scrutinizes such investments. See Scott
G. Alvarez, General Counsel, Sovereign Wealth Funds, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM (Apr. 24, 2008),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/alvarez20080424a.htm. The Securities Exchange Commission
also scrutinizes certain transactions of SWFs. See Ethiopis Tafara, Director, Office of International Affairs, Testimony
Concerning The Regulatory Framework for Sovereign Investments, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Apr. 24,
2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2008/ts0342408et.htm.
27No. 92 of 1975. Australia’s Foreign Investment Policy may be found at Policy, FIRB, http://www.firb.gov.au/
content/policy.asp(last visited Feb. 17, 2014).
28See generally Foreign Investment Review Board Annual Report 2011-12, FIRB 45, http://www.firb.gov.au/content/
Publications/AnnualReports/2012-2013/_downloads/FIRB-Annual-Report-2012-13.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2014) (under
“Foreign Government Investors”). The policy states, for example:
Where a proposal involves a foreign government or a related entity, the Australian Government also
considers if the investment is commercial in nature or if the investor may be pursuing broader political
or strategic objectives that may be contrary to Australia’s national interest. This includes assessing
whether the prospective investor’s governance arrangements could facilitate actual or potential control
by a foreign government (including through the investor’s funding arrangements). Proposals from
foreign government entities operating on a fully arm’s length and commercial basis are less likely to
raise national interest concerns than proposals from those that do not.”
Id.
Page 6 of 15
Hsu. International Review of Law 2015:swf.6
level matters such astaxation and governance of SWF investments.29 In its merger laws and
regulations, the terms “state-owned undertakings” and “state-owned companies” are used.30
V. RECENT LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS THAT COULD AFFECT SWFS
Sovereign wealth funds and SOEs have sometimes been juxtaposed together given that SWFs –
like SOEs – are state-owned or controlled. However their purposes can differ, and hence, there
have been attempts to distinguish them. The concerns they raise also differ. As Mandelsohn
succinctly explained:
There is . . . a tendency to lump Sovereign Wealth Funds in with state-owned enterprises.
We routinely hear the Dubai Ports deal, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation bid for
Unocal and Gazprom’s activities invoked as salutary warnings. But not only is there
nothing inherently wrong in these companies’ international ambitions, none of the bids
actually involved sovereign wealth funds at all. And while sovereign wealth funds generally
take non-controlling equity stakes, Dubai Ports was, perfectly legitimately, about the
takeover of one operator by another. Both kinds of asset sales can in certain
circumstances raise important issues. But treating them the same ignores the difference
between a state acting like a business and a state acting like an investor [italics added].31
As mentioned, the Santiago Principles aim to distinguish SWFs and SOEs and apply only to the
former.32 As observed by Professor Bassan, the points of distinction relate to “the source of their
funding, their function, the form of their respective investments: SWFs by portfolio investments,
SOEs by Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs, implying the control of the company).”33 He further
postulates a subjective and an objective element in distinguishing the two categories of entities.34
Some national laws have recently begun to address foreign government-related investments more
specifically, either through the concept of SOEs that invest, or through provisions on “foreign
government investors.”
1. Some recent national laws on investments by “SOEs” or foreign government investors
Some national laws have specifically increased their scrutiny over investments by SOEs through
legislative channels. However, there is no uniform definition as to SOEs within national systems,
nor do all systems contain specific references to these in the context of investment. Under US law,
the term SOE is not used in legislation.35
It was only in December 2012, for example, that Canada issued updated investment guidelines
with regard to such investments and the application of the “net benefit” test under her investment
legislation. The guidelines include the consideration of factors such as corporate governance and
structure of the non-Canadian investor and who controls it.36 Further, in 2013, an amendment to
section 3 of the Investment Canada Act37 was enacted to define SOEs whose investments may fall
under scrutiny, as follows:
29A Common European Approach to Sovereign Wealth Funds, supra note 3. See generally Bassan, supra note 8,
at 64–71. For further information on EU discussions on the Communication, see Julien Chaisse, The Regulation of
SWFs in the EU: Can the Supranational Level Limit the Rise of National Protectionism?, in SOVEREIGN INVESTMENT –
CONCERNS AND POLICY REACTIONS 462 (Sauvant, Sachs & Yongbloed eds., 2012). See also generally Mark Thatcher, National
Policies Towards Sovereign Wealth Funds in Europe: A Comparison of France, Germany and Italy, LONDON SCHOOL OF
ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE (2013), available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/programmes/kuwait/documents/National-
policies-towards-sovereign-wealth-funds-in-Europe.pdf.
30See EUROPEAN COMM’N COMPETITION, EU COMPETITION LAW: RULES APPLICABLE TO MERGER CONTROL 95 (2010), available at http://
ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/merger_compilation.pdf (Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice
under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (2008/C 95/01)).
31Mandelsohn, supra note 12.
32SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note 6.
33Bassan, supra note 8, at 21–23 n.16 & 17 (citing Larry Catá Backer, Sovereign Investing in Times of Crisis: Global
Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds, State Owned Enterprises and the Chinese Experience, 19 TRANS. L. & CONTEMP.
PROBLEMS 101–228.
34Bassan, supra note 8.
35ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., DISCUSSION ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE COMPETITIVE NEUTRALITY OF STATE-
OWNED ENTERPRISES 2 (2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/us-submissions-oecd-and-
other-international-competition-fora/antitrustlawroundtable.pdf.
36See Investment Canada Act, GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ica-lic.nsf/eng/lk00064.html#p2
(last visited Feb. 17, 2014).
37Vide Bill C-60, enacted as The Economic Action Plan 2013 Act, No. 1, S.C. 2013, c. 33 (Can.), available at
http://www.parl.gc.ca/LegisInfo/BillDetails.aspx?Language¼E&Mode ¼ 1&billId ¼ 6108103.
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“[S]tate-owned enterprise” means
(a) the government of a foreign state, whether federal, state or local, or an agency of such
a government;
(b) an entity that is controlled or influenced, directly or indirectly, by a government or
agency referred to in paragraph (a); or
(c) an individual who is acting under the direction of a government or agency referred to in
paragraph (a) or who is acting under the influence, directly or indirectly, of such a
government or agency.38
The amendment formally introduces into the legislation a definition of “SOE,” embracing the broad
scope of the Guidelines to include SOEs that are “controlled or influenced, directly or indirectly” by
a foreign government. The new provision signals the concern over state-influenced entities – and
not just state-controlled entities - in making investments in Canada. It does not however define
“influence” or indicate how it would be measured. The Guidelines do suggest that the Canadian
authorities will require the SOE investor to explain its structure and governance and to assure
them as to its commercial orientation.39 This would apply to SWFs seeking to make an investment
that is subject to review under the legislation.
In 2009, the Australian Senate Economics References Committee issued a report after a public
enquiry on SOEs and their investments in Australia. In September 2009, the Australian Government
issued its Response to the Report.40 With regard to SWFs and SOEs, the Australian Senate
Economics References Committee stated as follows:
While the committee welcomes the fact that organisations like the International Working
Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds have sought to codify the behaviours of SWFs, through
establishing a set of core principles related to governance, accountability and transparency,
the committee believes that the best way for Australia to regulate the conduct of foreign
investors (be they SWF, SOE or private commercial operator), is through developing robust
domestic legislation [italics added].41
It concluded that the existing regulatory framework was “sufficient.”42 The Australian Government
generally agreed with the recommendations of the majority report.
According to the Foreign Investment Review Board policy document of 2013, a “foreign
government investor” making a “direct investment” in Australia must notify and obtain approval from
the government.43 Annex A of the document defines a “foreign government investor” to include:
[A] body politic of a foreign country;
entities in which governments, their agencies or related entities from a single foreign
country have an aggregate interest (direct or indirect) of 15 per cent or more;
entities in which governments, their agencies or related entities from more than one
foreign country have an aggregate interest (direct or indirect) of 40 per cent or more;
or entities that are otherwise controlled by foreign governments, their agencies or related entities,
and any associates, or could be controlled by them including as part of a controlling group.
The Policy states that “entities” include companies, trusts and limited partnerships.
Annex 2 of the document further defines “direct investment” to include any investment of an
interest of 10 percent or more. Investments below 10 percent may still be covered if a strategic
38See Investment Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 28 (1st Supp.), as amended, available at http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/
eng/acts/I-21.8/page-1.html#h-3.
39The relevant portion of the Guidelines states:
It is the policy of the Government of Canada to ensure that the governance and commercial
orientationof SOEs are considered in determining whether reviewable acquisitions of control in Canada
by the SOE are of net benefit to Canada. In doing so, investors will be expected to address in their
plans and undertakings, the inherent characteristics of SOEs, specifically that they aresusceptible to
state influence. Investors will also need to demonstrate their strong commitment to transparent and
commercial operations [italics added].
See Changes to Investment Canada Act Implemented, MCMILLAN (2013), http://www.mcmillan.ca/Files/155579_changes
%20to%20Investment%20Canada%20Act%20implemented.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2014) (observing that Industry
Canada’s Investment Review Division has a “structured list of questions” to determine the extent, if any, of “influence”).
40The Report and the Response are available at Inquiry into foreign investment by state-owned entities, PARLIAMENT
OF AUSTRALIA, http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Economics/Completed%20inquiries/
2008-10/firb_09/index (last visited Feb. 13, 2014).
41Id. at { 4.25; see also id. at { 4.70.
42Id. at { 4.72.
43FIRB, AUSTRALIA’S FOREIGN INVESTMENT POLICY (2013), available at http://www.firb.gov.au/content/_downloads/AFIP_2013.pdf.
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stake is being built, or the investment can be used to influence or control the target investment,
such as through preferential, special or veto voting rights.44
The EU has been examining foreign-SOE dealings under its Merger Regulation.45 In 2011, China,
herself a major player in the field of SWFs and SOEs, enacted regulations on national security
reviews for certain mergers with and acquisitions of Chinese enterprises by “foreign investors,”
in implementation of her Anti-Monopoly Law.46
2. FTAs – Emerging disciplines?
Apart from national laws that may affect SWF activity, some recent treaties may also have an
impact on them. Countries frequently amend their laws in order to comply with FTA commitments,
and where such commitments call for changes in the way domestic SOEs (and SWFs) operate or
are governed, they may have an important impact.47 While SOEs have existed for many years,
interest in them has arisen in two more recent contexts: first, over disciplines introduced in
bilateral trade treaties to ensure a level competitive playing field where SOEs exist, and secondly,
over their activities beyond their own borders.48 State-owned enterprises are relatively common in
Asia, and certain states in Asia have made specific carve-outs when it comes to investment
disciplines in treaties.49
In the first context, states have in some cases taken the opportunity when negotiating FTAs to
include disciplines – particularly to address anticompetitive conduct of SOEs – with their counter-
part treaty states. Examples are the US FTAs with Oman and with Singapore.
The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) negotiations currently underway between twelve
states may bring into being new disciplines affecting SOEs. In September 2012, the Assistant US
Trade Representative, Ms.Barbara Weisel, reportedly said:
There are sovereign wealth funds that are just managing their portfolio investments, and
there are sovereign wealth funds that do that as well as own companies . . . So we’re
making a distinction between the companies they own, and the portfolio investment
they’re managing. . . . And so for those [sovereign wealth funds] that own commercial
companies, we seek to have those companies - those state commercial enterprises -
disciplined as well.50
44Id. at 15.
45Council Regulation (EC) 139/2004, On the control of concentrations between undertakings, available at http://ec.
europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/legislation.html. For an example of a case applying this Regulation to a
Chinese SOE merger, seeEUROPEAN COMM’N, CASE NO COMP/M.6113 – DSM/SINOCHEM/JV, COMMISSION DECISION PURSUANT TO
ARTICLE 6(1)(B) OF COUNCIL REGULATION NO 139/2004 (2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/
decisions/m6113_20110519_20310_1812856_EN.pdf.
46Art. 31 of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law permits a national security review of certain foreign investor dealings.
Text of the Law is available at Anti-monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Aug. 3, 2008), http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/Businessregulations/201303/
20130300045909.shtml (last visited Feb. 20, 2014). Implementing regulations were enacted in 2011. See Circular of
the General Office of the State Council on the Establishment of Security Review System Regarding Merger and
Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Mar. 4, 2011),
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/aaa/201103/20110307430493.shtml (last visited Feb. 20, 2014).
47Support for this view is found for example in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL POLICY 137 (Mordechai
E. Kreinin & Michael G. Plummer eds., 2012); AHMED GALAL & ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE, ANCHORING REFORM OF SOES WITH US-EGYPT
FTA 37 (2005). The converse has also been raised: reform on SOE regulations has also been argued to be helpful to
FTA negotiations. See Ngoc Lan, SOE reform will help FTA talks with EU: expert, THE SAIGON TIMES, Mar. 13, 2013,
http://www.vietmaz.com/2013/03/soe-reform-will-help-fta-talks-with-eu-expert/#.UtpsAT8RWM8.
48SOEs have been a subject of discipline under GATT and GATS for some time. See Bassan, supra note 8, at 56.
They have also been the subject of “soft” codes of conduct, such as the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance
of State-Owned Enterprises, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceofstate-ownedenterprises/
34803211.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2014).
49See, e.g., ASEAN Compehensive [sic] Investment Agreement Reservation List, ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
(Feb. 26, 2009), http://www.asean.org/news/item/asean-compehensive-investment-agreement-reservation-list (last
visited Nov. 30, 2014). The text of the ACIA is available at http://www.asean.org/images/archive/documents/FINAL-
SIGNED-ACIA.pdf; Malaysia, SINGAPORE GOVERNMENT, http://www.fta.gov.sg/afta/9malaysia.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2014);
Myanmar, SINGAPORE GOVERNMENT, http://www.fta.gov.sg/afta/9myanmar.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2014); Singapore,
SINGAPORE GOVERNMENT, http://www.fta.gov.sg/afta/9singapore.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2014); Vietnam, SINGAPORE
GOVERNMENT, http://www.fta.gov.sg/afta/9viet%20nam.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2014).
50See U.S. Clarifies Treatment of Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment In TPP, WORLD TRADE ONLINE - INSIDE US TRADE
(Sept. 20, 2012), http://insidetrade.com/Inside-Trade-General/Public-Content-World-Trade-Online/us-clarifies-treatment-
of-sovereign-wealth-fund-investment-in-tpp/menu-id-896.html?S¼LI (last visited Jan. 17, 2014).
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If this approach is indeed adopted in the TPP, the proposed disciplines proposed by the US will
apparently not discipline SWF portfolio investments. It will then be important to see how the
negotiating parties define “portfolio investment,” i.e., by passivity in holdings, or some other
means.51 There has been some suggestion that the US-Singapore FTA provisions may provide an
example of the TPP approach.52 Ms.Weisel reportedly explained: “We don’t see sovereign wealth
funds as entities that raise the immediate concerns about competition that we have from other
entities.”53 One might surmise from this that the TPP provisions will probably carve out SWFs that
make portfolio investments from any competition-centric provisions adopted from the USSFTA.
Beyond this, it is not presently publicly known how exactly – if at all – SWFswill be dealt with in
the TPP, and whether an Investment Chapter would apply in entirety to such investors and their
investments.
Apart from the TPP, SOEs have also been an important subject in the ongoing negotiations for
an Australia-China FTA.54 Any specific FTA provisions on SOEs or SWFs would augment broader
treaty disciplines and dispute settlement (usually arbitration) mechanisms of such a treaty, unless
expressly exempted.55 While most existing treaties have not made a clear distinction between
SOEs and SWFs, this might change, especially through the TPP, if and when it comes to fruition.
Its provisions may be ground-breaking as it is seen as a “template” for further agreements.56
3. State investors in FTAs/BITs –observations from some recent US FTAS
State-owned or state-controlled entities as “investors”
Some bilateral and regional treaties refer to the private or public ownership of an entity when
defining an “investor,” with a view to including both kinds. For example, the US Model Bilateral
Investment Treaty 2012 defines an “enterprise,” “investor of a Party,” and “state enterprise”
respectively as follows:
“[E]nterprise” means any entity constituted or organized under applicable law, whether or
not for profit, and whether privately or governmentally owned or controlled, including a
corporation, trust, partnership, sole proprietorship, joint venture, association, or similar
organization; and a branch of an enterprise. . . . “investor of a Party” means a Party or
state enterprise thereof, or a national or an enterprise of a Party, that attempts to make, is
making, or has made an investment in the territory of the other Party; provided, however,
that a natural person who is a dual national shall be deemed to be exclusively a national
of the State of his or her dominant and effective nationality. . . . “state enterprise” means
an enterprise owned, or controlled through ownership interests, by a Party” [italics
added].57
Such language has been reflected in some, though not all, of the US’ bilateral FTAs. For example,
in its FTAs such as that signed with Peru, Bahrain, and with Oman, the above terms and
51See Paul Rose, SWFs: Active or Passive Investors?, 118 YALE L.J. 104 (2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id¼1307182; OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 593 (Mike Wright, Donald S. Siegel,
Kevin Keasey & Igor Filatotchev eds., 2013). In stating a Canadian view, Marc LeBlanc states: “In practice, SWFs are a
distinct type of SOE because they are typically passive investors that tend to invest in financial assets (stocks and
bonds) instead of acquiring real assets (factory and land) of a business and taking an active role in its operation.”
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS: INTERNATIONAL AND CANADIAN POLICY RESPONSES6 (2010), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/
LOP/ResearchPublications/2010-09-e.pdf. See alsoKavaljit Singh, Majority of SWFs are passive, and patient, investors,
Financial Times (Oct. 23, 2008, 3:00 AM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d9bde982-a09a-11dd-80a0-000077b07658.html.
52Lists of Reservations of Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore and of Vietnam to the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment
Agreement, supra note 51.
53Lists of Reservations of Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore and of Vietnam to the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment
Agreement, supra note 51.
54See Mark Kenny, PM seeks to fast-track China free-trade deal, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Oct. 8, 2013, http://www.
smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/pm-seeks-to-fasttrack-china-freetrade-deal-20131007-2v4ce.html; Australia
PM Pledges to Finalize FTA with China in 12 Months, XINHUA (Oct. 8, 2013, 8:18), http://english.people.com.cn/busi
ness/8417931.html.
55For a discussion on such broader investment provisions, see, e.g., Bassan, supra note 8, at 116-148.
56Mr. Michael Froman, the current United States Trade Representative, has reportedly stated that the TPP is “being
developed as a potential platform for regional integration as a whole as well as a possible template for how these
emerging issues might be addressed in future broader trade agreements.” Lists of Reservations of Malaysia,
Myanmar, Singapore and of Vietnam to the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement, supra note 51.
57OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE 2, http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%
20Meeting.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2014). Such definitions were already present in the 2004 Model BIT. See2004
Model BIT, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2014).
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definitions - including “state enterprise” - is used.58 The US-Korea FTA also includes a definition of
state enterprise and further carries an accompanying footnote: “state enterprise means an
enterprise that is owned, or controlled through ownership interests, by a Party; . . . For greater
certainty, ownership, or control through ownership interests, may be direct or indirect.”59
However, in Chapter 15 of the US-Singapore FTA (USSFTA) on Investment, while “enterprise” and
“investor of a Party” appear and are similarly defined as above, the term “state enterprise” is not used in
that chapter.60 Instead, in the context of anti-competition disciplines, the term “government enterprise” is
used instead in the FTA.61 For Singapore, the definition of government enterprises there means an
enterprise in which Singapore has “effective influence.”62 Effective influence is in turn defined in Art. 12.8.5:
[E]ffective influence exists where the government and its government enterprises, alone or
in combination:
(a) own more that 50 percent of the voting rights of an entity; or
(b) have the ability to exercise substantial influence over the composition of the board of
directors or any other managing body of an entity, to determine the outcome of decisions
on the strategic, financial, or operating policies or plans of an entity, or otherwise to
exercise substantial influence over the management or operation of an entity. Where the
government and its government enterprises, alone or in combination, own 50 percent or
less, but more than 20 percent, of the voting securities of the entity and own the largest
block of voting rights of such entity, there is a rebuttable presumption that effective
influence exists. Annex 12A provides an illustration of how the analysis of effective
influence should proceed [italics added].
The provision does not, however, explain how the presumption may be rebutted, such as the
nature or the level of proof required; nor is the related notion in (b) of “substantial influence”
defined or clarified. Annex 12A (in supplementary file) provides an illustrative chart and notes but
these do not answer these questions either.
Further, the following discipline, inter alia, applies to such entities:
Singapore shall take no action or attempt in any way, directly or indirectly, to influence or
direct decisions of its government enterprises, including through the exercise of any rights or
interests conferring effective influence over such enterprises, except in a manner consistent
with this Agreement. However, Singapore may exercise its voting rights in government
enterprises in a manner that is not inconsistent with this Agreement [italics added].63
Singapore is also obliged to adhere to certain disclosure obligations with regard to a “covered entity.”64
Two observations are raised here: First, the use of the notion of “effective influence” expands
the scope of actions covered by the obligations. Second, the use of a presumption for when such
effective influence exists is a powerful tool, as it places the onus on the other state to rebut or
disprove effective influence. The use of this presumption is clever as state and state-related
influence is not always easy to prove. It remains to be seen whether and how effective influence
and its presumption may be reprised in the context of the TPP vis-à-vis competition provisions,
and whether they are applied in relation to investment disciplines under the agreement.
58Trade Promotion Agreement, US-Peru, Art. 1.3, Apr. 12, 2006 (entered into force Feb. 1, 2009), available
at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/peru/asset_upload_file78_9547.pdf; PERU TRADE
PROMOTION AGREEMENT, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/
peru-tpa (last visited Oct. 22, 2014); Free Trade Agreement, US-Bahrain, Art. 1.3, (entered into force Aug. 1, 2006),
available at http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/All_Trade_Agreements/exp_006966.asp; FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS,
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/industry-manufacturing/industrial-tariffs/free-
trade-agreements#U.S.-Oman%20Free%20Trade%20Agreement (last visited Oct. 22, 2014); Free Trade Agreement,
US-Oman, Art. 1.4, [Jan. 19, 2006] (entered into force Jan. 1, 2009), available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/
uploads/agreements/fta/oman/asset_upload_file976_8810.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2014); FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS, OFFICE
OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/industry-manufacturing/industrial-tariffs/free-trade-
agreements#U.S.-Oman%20Free%20Trade%20Agreement (last visited Oct. 22, 2014).
59See Free Trade Agreement, US-Korea, Art. 1.4, [June 30, 2007] (entered into force Mar. 15, 2012), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/korus/asset_upload_file816_12698.pdf (last visited
Oct. 22, 2014).
60Overview of United States (USSFTA), SINGAPORE GOVERNMENT (Apr. 26, 2012), http://www.fta.gov.sg/fta_ussfta.asp?
hl¼13 (last visited Oct. 20, 2014) [hereinafter USSFTA ].
61The term “government enterprises” is used in Chapter 12, covering “Anticompetitive Business Conduct, Designated
Monopolies and Government Enterprises.” Id.
62USSFTA at Art. 12.8.
63USSFTA at Art. 12.3(2)(e).
64USSFTA at Art. 12.3(2)(g); USSFTA at Art. 12.8(1).
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While the treaty practice of the United States – a recipient of SWF investments - does not
appear to reflect a totally uniform approach on the use of “state enterprise” in its FTA investment
provisions at this point, it generally does include government-owned enterprises within its
investment provisions. This permits SWFs investors who fulfill other criteria in the investment
provisions to be able to benefit from the FTA’s protection and investor-state dispute settlement
mechanism as well, as is the case with private investors under the FTA.
Likewise, as the Singapore-Australia FTA includes investors which are government-owned or
controlled. Art. 1.1 defines an “enterprise” (that may be an “investor”) as follows:
“[E]nterprise” means any corporation, company, association, partnership, trust, joint
venture, sole-proprietorship or other legally recognised entity that is duly incorporated,
constituted, set up, or otherwise duly organised under the law of a Party, including
branches, regardless of whether or not the entity is organised for pecuniary gain, privately
or otherwise owned, or organised with limited or unlimited liability [italics added].65
Within ASEAN, the ACIA expressly includes government-owned entities as possible investors
within its definition of “investor,” read with that of “juridical person:”
(d) “investor” means a natural person of a Member State or a juridical person of a Member
State that is making, or has made an investment in the territory of any other Member State;
(e) “juridical person” means any legal entity duly constituted or otherwise organised under
the applicable law of a Member State, whether for profit or otherwise, and whether private-
owned or governmentally-owned, including any enterprise, corporation, trust, partnership,
joint venture, sole proprietorship, association, or organization [italics added].66
In addition, an explicit exclusion of “portfolio investments” that applied under an earlier ASEAN
investment agreement (now superseded by the ACIA) does not exist under the ACIA.67
The EU’s negotiating stance on investments reflects a general policy of openness to investments
by entities such as SWFs and it remains to be seen how treaty provisions (if at all) will deal with
them specifically.68 So far, provisions appear to address “state trading enterprises,” a term found
in the WTO’s General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994.69 The EU-Korea FTA, for example,the
first of the EU’s “new generation” FTAs, which entered into force in July 2011, includes a provision
on “state trading enterprises” which reprises largely WTO disciplines, in the context of trade in
goods.70 The FTA does not include an Investment Chapter. However, in the FTA, the EU Schedule
of Commitments relating to trade in services does include at least one EU member’s reservation
65See text of the Agreement after 2nd Review, available at http://www.fta.gov.sg/safta/fta_safta_chp8_2nd%
20review.pdf. The original Chapter 8 text is available at http://www.fta.gov.sg/safta/fta_safta_chp8.pdf.
66Entered into force Mar. 29, 2012. See ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA) Enters Into Force
Creating a Stable and Predictable Business Investment Environment, ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (July 24,
2012), http://www.asean.org/news/asean-secretariat-news/item/asean-comprehensive-investment-agreement-acia-
enters-into-force-creating-a-stable-and-predictable-business-investment-environment) (last visited Oct. 22, 2014);
text available at http://www.asean.org/images/2012/Economic/AIA/Agreement/ASEAN%20Comprehensive%20Investm
ent%20Agreement%20%28ACIA%29%202012.pdf.
67The exclusion was found in Art. 2(a) of the Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment Area, which is now
superseded vide Art. 47(1) of the ACIA.
68See generally Sovereign Wealth Funds, EUROPEAN COMM’N (Oct. 17, 2014), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/
capital/third-countries/sovereign_wealth_funds/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2014); see alsoA Common
European Approach to Sovereign Wealth Funds, supra note 3.
69Art. XVII, GATT 1994. WTO Legal Texts, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/
legal_e.htm#goods (last visited Feb. 19, 2014).
70Art. 2.13 provides as follows:
Article 2.13
State trading enterprises
1. The Parties affirm their existing rights and obligations under Article XVII of GATT 1994, its
interpretative notes and the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII of GATT 1994, contained
in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement which are incorporated into and made part of this Agreement,
mutatis mutandis.
2. Where a Party requests information from the other Party on individual cases of state trading
enterprises, the manner of their operation and the effect of their operations on bilateral trade, the
requested Party shall have regard to the need to ensure maximum transparency possible without
prejudice to Article XVII.4(d) of GATT 1994 on confidential information.
See generally South Korea, EUROPEAN COMM’N (Sept. 9, 2014), http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/
countries/south-korea/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2014) (EU information on this FTA).
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on establishment of enterprises by government-related entities. The reservation by Spain lists the
following for “all sectors”: “ES: Investment in Spain by foreign governments and foreign public
entities(9), directly or through companies or other entities controlled directly or indirectly by
foreign governments, needs prior authorisation by the government” [italics added].71 Footnote (9)
of the reservation, which does not define the term “foreign public entities,” statesinstead what
may appear to be the rationale for the reservation: “Such investment tends to imply not only
economic interests, but also non-economic interests for these entities.”
On a more general note, it appears that the government-related nature of an entity (such as a
SWF) generally does not prevent it from benefiting from the range of investment protection
afforded in the treaties, which may include most favored nation treatment, national treatment and
fair and equitable treatment guarantees. In addition, as qualifying “investors” the treaties’ investor-
state dispute settlement processes should also be available in the event of a dispute.72
Additionally, so far only the USSFTA has sought to impose treaty disciplines on SOEs based on
influence, presumed or actual. What challenges does such a provision pose to treaty states with
SWFs? On one hand it may be difficult for a recipient to prove influence. If the rationale is to
ensure the investor operates on a commercial basis like private investors, is this a realistic
solution? Influence, if it is wielded, can be asserted in a variety of invisible, subjective ways,
outside formal corporate structures and codes. On the other hand, the use of a presumption
based on objective facts such as structure or holdings makes it difficult for the investor as it has
to prove a negative, or the absence of influence. It is unclear what kind of satisfactory evidence
could be brought in this regard. While recipient countries use national laws, treaties and
non-binding codes of conduct to press SWFs for transparency and disclosure of ownership,
reporting, governance structures and principles, certain SWFs may still be subject to influence of
their governments behind the scenes. However, those which are not, may be hard put to prove
satisfactorily they are not, as a provision such as that in the USSFTA does not make it clear as to
what level of proof is sufficient to rebut the presumption.
VI. SEEKING AN IDENTITY IN TREATIES: “YES” TO DIFFERENTIATION BUT “NO” TO
DISCRIMINATION?
SWFs continue to defy universal definition and treatment. As one author has put it, SWFs are
“in search of a direct relationship” with host states.73 Should SWFs be treated differently from
other investors, and if so, why, and how?
Some have argued against SWFs as a unique category from other foreign investors, mainly for
fear that SWFs would be subject to discriminatory, i.e., less favorable, treatment as compared
with other foreign investors.74 While differential and discriminatory treatment may sometimes
have been conflated, it is important to distinguish these notions.75 It may be viable to provide
differential yet non-discriminatory treatment for SWFs. Sovereign wealth funds may for
example wish to be treated like other foreign investors insofar as their treaty remedies are
concerned.76 OECD guidelines that were formed alongside the establishment of the
71Id. At Annex 7A-2 (in relation to Art. 7.13 on establishment of presence of investors in relation to the supply of
services).
72See alsoPROSPECTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY – WORLD TRADE FORUM 93 (Roberto Echandi & Pierre Sauvé
eds., 2013).
73Bassan, supra note 8, at 55.
74See, e.g., Murray, supra note 7, at 9-15, 18-21.
75Murray, supra note 7, at 18. See also Carolyn Ervin, Director, OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs,
Should sovereign wealth funds be treated differently than other investors?, OECD OBSERVER, http://www.oecdobserver.
org/news/archivestory.php/aid/2610/Sovereign_wealth_funds.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2014).
76Bassan, supra note 8, at 143-44, opines:
. . . in the practice of treaties or in past arbitration awards, the difference between public or private
control of the legal person is never relevant. Therefore, state-owned entities can legitimately claim a
violation of the BIT; the same is true for SWFs, the difference being the two vehicles being irrelevant
for this purpose. . . . the capability of a SWF to raise a claim under a BIT will depend much on the
text of the BIT . . . ” (citing an example in the Kuwait-Germany BIT 1994 identifying the state (Kuwait)
acting through investor Kuwait Investment Authority as an “investor.”).
He goes on to mention the agreements between Kuwait-France, Qatar-Germany, Qatar-France and Qatar-China as
well.
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Santiago Principles in 2008, for example, specifically address discriminatory treatment of recipient
states.77
It may be desirable for SWF home states that negotiate treaties to request differential treatment
that would allow SWF investors and their investments to be treated favorably when compared with
“like” investors and investments, i.e., other SWFs, or, even more specifically, other SWFs of either
similar legal nature (e.g., whether a central bank or a corporate entity owned by a foreign
government). So far, no treaty appears to have incorporated such express features.
Such an approach would pay due regard to their hybrid nature, without necessarily subjecting
them to discriminatory (less favorable) treatment as compared with other foreign investors. Even
the non-discrimination provisions in Investment Chapters of FTAs and bilateral investment treaties
(BITs) often refer to a comparison of treatment of “like” investors or of “like investments.”
In negotiating treaties, other relevant considerations that could provide greater certainty include,
for instance, whether a minimum threshold of share ownership should apply before any differential
treatment should arise with respect to an SWF; below such a threshold it will be treated as any
other foreign investor. A SWF home state may also consider requesting that its treaty partner
specify sectors or industries that are considered sensitive or strategic (by a “positive list”
approach), so that SWF investment only in these would trigger any differential treatment or
processes. With such provisions, SWFs investing in all other sectors or industries would enjoy the
same scrutiny as other foreign investors.
VII. CONCLUSION
The status of SWFs continues to be controversial and much debated, and this debate is likely to
go on for the foreseeable future. Since it is unlikely that a multilateral set of rules for SWFs will be
decided on in the immediate future, bilateral treaties such as FTAs are the next possible staging
ground for commitments which affect SWFs. Such commitments may take the form of investment-
related and/or competition law-related disciplines which are designed to apply to SOEs, a broader
category than SWFs. The competition model has already begun to appear, such as that in the
USSFTA. The question is what further disciplines will be introduced in coming treaties such as the
TPP, which has a number of Asian negotiating states that have both SWFs and SOEs.78 As the
negotiations for the TPP – and any new disciplines on SOEs and/or SWFs - are still evolving at
this point, there is an opportunity for both recipient states and SWF investor states to find a way
to have the relevant concerns and interests of both to be best represented in the coming
Agreement, since this is hailed as a “template” for future agreements. While national laws will
continue to exist particularly to safeguard scrutiny based on national security concerns, treaty
provisions can be used to define more clearly the types of state-owned/-controlled entities which
are to be included/excluded, and for those that are included, the kind of provisions that will best
deal with concerns relating to them, on the part of all treaty parties concerned. This is necessary
in order for a balanced, sustainable relationship to be maintained between recipient states, SWFs
and SOEs within the context of the TPP (and other future treaties). Distinct provisions that are
relevant will be competition provisions, national security provisions, and investment provisions as
they apply to SWFs (if these differ from how they apply to other foreign investors under the
treaty).
Some key guiding principles in crafting a treaty-based “identity” for SWFs are the following:
. Provisions could draw key ideas from the Santiago Principles, the OECD Declaration on
Sovereign Wealth Funds and Recipient Country Policies and the OECD Guidelines for
Recipient Country Investment Policies on National Security, improving on them to the extent
that negotiating agendas permit;
. reflecting the hybrid nature of SWFs and ensuring non-discrimination against them in such
agreements, while permitting non-discriminatory differentiation;
77See OECD Declaration on SWFs and Recipient Country Policies and Guidelines for Recipient Country Investment
Policies on National Security, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/investment/investment-policy/oecdguidanceonsovereign
wealthfunds.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2014). See also generally Chaisse, supra note 29, at 462.
78For general information on SOEs in Asia, see ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., POLICY BRIEF ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES IN ASIA (2010), available at http://www.oecd.org/countries/philippines/45639683.
pdf.
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. providing clarity as to whether provisions on SOEs would or would not apply to a treaty
state’s SWF investments; and
. considering how any investment or competition policy provisionson government “influence”
could be crafted in a balanced way to neither make proof (or disproof, in the case of the
USSFTA’s use of a presumption, mentioned above) of such a factor, an unfeasible task.
There is certainly much room for further debate as to how a balanced and appropriate approach
to handling SWFs could be incorporated in coming trade and investment treaties. The above
provides some suggestions on the way forward as FTAs continue to play an important role in
shaping investor-host state relations. For now though, it seems that SWFs will remain a “Janus”
among investment funds, with the duality of their private-public aspects caught in a state of
transition.
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